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I. INTRODUCTION
What do we want from space?
We want the knowledge we can gain from scientific research; we can
learn much about the Earth and its inhabitants, as well as the universe
around us, by studying space.
We want to explore, to satisfy the thirst for adventure and conquest
imagined in countless science fiction books and films.
We want to improve our collective lot down here on Earth.
Space offers the potential for practically limitless wealth, some already
being exploited, some we may only harness in the distant future, and un-
doubtedly some we cannot begin to guess. Already the wealth of space is
being developed in the form of telecommunications and remote satellite ob-
servation. The private-sector investment in telecommunications satellites
alone was projected to total $54.3 billion (including launch) between 1996
and 20001 -- and this figure doesn't include other commercial space ven-
tures, nor does it include investment in Russian and Chinese satellites. A
further $70 billion was projected to be invested in satellite communications
ground stations over the same period.2 Research in materials science is un-
covering phenomena unique to the low- and no-gravity environment of
space, and the space-based processing of these new alloys, composites, ce-
ramics and polymers may soon become an important industry.3 The field of
biotechnology is also taking advantage of zero-gravity conditions to manu-
Associate, Kirkland & Ellis (New York Office).
'Office for Outer Space Affairs, Highlights in Space: Progress in Space Science, Tech-
nology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law, Ann. Rep. 1 (1996).
(hereinafter Highlights 1996).21d.
3United Nations, Office for Outer Space Affairs, Highlights in Space: Progress in Space
Science, Technology and Applications, International, Cooperation and Space Law, U.N. Doc
A/AC.105/618 98-99 (1995).
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facture protein crystals, which the pharmaceutical industry can use to create
drugs that are able to "turn off' a protein, thereby regulating metabolic pro-
cesses.4 Engineers have considered the possibility of capturing solar energy
in massive quantities by laying out giant cells in space and on our moon.
Perhaps the most lucrative area of development is the mining of celes-
tial bodies. On the moon, an assay of only 30 km2 of the lunar surface dur-
ing Apollo-17 turned up deposits of Helium-3, a radiation-free fusion
reactor fuel, practically nonexistent on Earth, that is more efficient than any
radioactive fuel currently available.6  So-called near-Earth asteroids
("NEAs"), six are closer to Earth than our moon and more than 50 closer
than Mars,7 might also be optimal targets for early development. The
smaller of these asteroids have negligible gravitational fields, which would
reduce fuel costs far below what is necessary for a lunar mission. Many of
these NEAs seem to be rich in raw materials that are either rare and valu-
able on Earth, or common on Earth, needed in space, but expensive to
launch.8 For instance, there is accumulating evidence that some NEAs
contain gold, rhenium, germanium, and platinum-group metals -- platinum,
palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium, and ruthenium -- at concentrations of
up to 100 times those that are mined on Earth.9 Glenn Reynolds 0 has ob-
served, "The smallest known near-Earth metal asteroid contains more metal
than has been mined by humanity since the beginning of time."'" It has
been estimated that 2,000 NEAs larger than 1 km in diameter exist.12
Finally, space colonization, though on the distant horizon, is not neces-
sarily a fantasy. Colonization -- pushing humanity's living room beyond its
"surly bonds" -- might, depending on how it's implemented, represent a
complete answer to the potential disaster of overpopulation and its effects.
Until very recently, harvesting the bounty of space in any of the afore-
mentioned ways has been precluded by technological and financial consid-
4 Highlights 1996, supra note 1, at 90-91.5See infra note 21 and accompanying text.6Jeffrey S. Kargel, Digging For Gold: US. National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration 's Plans For Mining Extraterrestrial Resources, ASTRONOMY, Dec. 1997, at 48. See
also Apollo Astronauts Call For New Space Exploration, Private Funding in Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, Dec. 11, 1997.7William Barton and Michael Capobianco, Harvesting the Near-Earthers, AD ASTRA,
Nov. 1989, at 27.
'Kargel, supra note 6, at 48.
'Id.; see also Barton and Capobianco, supra note 7, at 30.
"'Glenn Reynolds is a law professor at the University of Tennessee, and co-wrote the in-
fluential book, GLENN H. REYNOLDS AND ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY (2 nd ed., 1997).
"Glenn Reynolds, quoted in Keay Davidson, $15.99 for 1,800 On The Moon Plus
Eunar Tax-; Entrepreneurs Going Where No Capitalist Has Gone Before, S.F. EXAM., Feb.
15, 1998, at Al.
'
2 Kargel, supra note 6, at 48 (citing study by David Rabinowitz and Eugene Shoemaker).
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erations. Recent price estimates of launching material into orbit costs ap-
proximately $10,000per pound; 13 $25,000-30,000 per pound of material to
launch to our moon.' The tremendous cost of launch, retrieval, and return
means that "[i]f there was gold in low Earth orbit and all the shuttle had to
do was go up and open its cargo bay doors and let [the gold] fall in, it
wouldn't be worth it, even then."' S
In the not-too-distant future, however, many of these activities may be-
come economically feasible. The price of launch has decreased 16 due to
improved technology and increased competition. 7 The price tag on robotic
space missions, likely to be the avant garde of space mining endeavors, is
one-fourth of what it was six years ago. 8 Several real-world companies
have begun to plan for the day that launch costs fall to a level at which they
could profit from space mining. SpaceDev, a Colorado-based provider of
commercial space missions and small commercial launch vehicles, is cur-
rently traded on the over-the-counter stock market.19
If a firm is eventually able to bring ore down to Earth, the total wealth
available to humanity will be increased. The estimated Helium-3 reserves
on our moon would create, in a controlled fusion reaction, 10 times as much
energy as is contained in Earth's recoverable coal, oil, and gas combined.2°
What is stopping these companies now, perhaps more than the money or
technology, is the uncertainty of the legal regime. If exploitation of outer
space's bounty is our goal, we must establish a space property legal system
that creates both incentives and predictability. Space development is a
highly risky endeavor, as well as mind-bogglingly expensive. Who would
expend the effort in developing a space colony, if they were not certain of
the project's legality? Valuable projects -- energy collection, mining, and
colonization -- are by no means inevitable. If the law of outer space rejects
such uses, or even makes their legality uncertain, it is unlikely that the nec-
13Lawrence Roberts, Ensuring the Best of All Possible Worlds: Environmental Regula-
tion of the Solar System, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 126, 127 n.2, citing Parametric Cost Esti-
mating Reference Manual, US. Expendable launch Vehicle data for Planetary Missions(visited April 29, 1998) <http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/ELVUS.html>; Davidson, supra
note 11, at Al, quoting Comment of Robert Park (spokesperson for the American Physical
Society, the world's largest organization of physicists). For current launch rates, see
SpaceDev, Homepage (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.spacedev.com>.
14Earl C. Herkenhoff, Moon Mining, ENGIMNERrNG & MNIG J., June 1990, at 16M,
cited in Roberts, supra note 13, at 160.
'sDavidson, supra note 11, (quoting Comment of Robert Park).
16See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
17Public and private launch agencies in Europe, Japan, and Russia have broken the mo-
nopoly on launch services once held by the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R.
Kargel, supra note 6.
181d.
19 SpaceDev, Homepage (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.spacedev.com>, OTC
trading symbol: SPDV.20 RICHAR)S. LEwis, SPACE IN THE 21s r CENTURY 143 (1990).
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essary technology would ever be created. A promising solution to our ever-
growing energy needs involves setting up giant banks of solar panels in
Earth's orbit and on the moon's sunny side, using the solar energy to power
space development projects, and then beaming the excess down to Earth as
microwave energy for terrestrial use.2 Will a private electric company be
willing to develop such a lunar solar collection system? Not without a field
of space law that permits exploitation and a strong rate of return on invest-
ment. Unless we can impose a rule of law that eliminates uncertainty while
permitting the highest possible rate of return, we may be denied access to
the fruits of space for a long time to come.
II. THE NEED FOR A LAW OF PROPERTY
Commercialization of space is no longer technologically unimaginable.
But it may be illegal. The most fundamentally important document in space
law for the last three decades has been the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Outer Celestial Bodies (better known as the "Outer Space
Treaty" or "OST").2 2 The Outer Space Treaty was hashed out in a politi-
cally tense environment. Negotiations began on the heels of the Soviet
Union's earthshaking Sputnik launch in 1957. Each side of the Cold War
was concerned that the other might gain irreversible advantage by milita-
rizing outer space.23 The OST grew up as much a document of prevention
as one of hope. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII) of
October 17, 1963, on which parts of the OST were based, explicitly in-
tended to "avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new
field. 24 The U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly remarked
at a U.N. plenary session during OST negotiations,
We of the United States regard this treaty as an important step toward
peace... Therefore, as we stand on the threshold of the space age, our first re-
sponsibility as governments is clear: we must make sure that man's earthly
conflicts will not be carried into outer space... [The Outer Space Treaty] re-
sponds to that desire and hope.25
21 Kargel, supra note 6.
22Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Outer Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,610 U.N.T.S. 205.
23Glenn H. Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the 21st Century, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 229 (1992).24Eric Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc.
359, 362-363 (1994) citing G.A. Res. 1963, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., at 206.25December 17, 1966 statement of U.S. Representative to the General Assembly Arthur
J. Goldberg, quoted in Staff Report, U.S. Senate Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sci-
ences, Treaty On Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 15 (1967).
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The lion's share of discussion dealt with arms control provisions, juris-
diction over spaceships, deciding which military activities are banned by
the "peaceful purposes" clause,26 and the like. In fact, the atmosphere was
so contentious that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. representatives bickered even as
to which side originated the OST's basic ideals.27 Creating a space property
law supportive of private development was not a priority. Each side of the
Cold War was hoping to prevent the other from advancing as a sovereign
into outer space and achieving an insurmountable military and geographic
superiority. As a result, the OST is at best ambiguous, and at worst hostile,
to the privatization and commercialization of space resources.
Why is a definitive property law needed? There are at least three rea-
sons.
A. Division of limited resources
Space may be vast, but many of the most valuable resources -- espe-
cially those convenient to Earth -- are limited. Our moon is one example.
It mau be one of the most promising sites for mining,28 energy-capture proj-
ects,2 and spaceship refueling,30 but a limited amount of usable land exists,
with an even more limited quantity of usable water.3' For another example,
26Outer Space Treaty, art. IV, requires that celestial bodies be used only for peaceful
purposes. For an example of this sort of analysis, see Daniel Goedhuis, Some Comments of
the United Nations'Outer Space Treaty ofJanuary 1967, lecture given on Sept. 28, 1967.27The story of the Outer Space Treaty may be briefly told. Its parentage is disputed. The
Soviet Union regards it as a late and grudging acceptance by others of their thesis that the
first step to be taken was, as they had proposed in 1958, an international treaty on co-
operation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space. The United States regards it as
an expansion of their proposal or a treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other
celestial bodies, which was made by President Johnson on May 7, 1966, but enlarged to
cover activities in outer space.
H.G. Darwin, The Outer Space Treaty, 42 B.Y.I.L. 278 (1967), quoted in Husby, supra
note 24, at 359 (n. 8).28The moon is thought to contain quantities of titanium, aluminum, and sodium. Jack
Green, Lunar Materials Processing, in THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF SPACE: ADVANCES IN THE
ASTRONAUTICAL SCIENCES 447 (Richard A. Van Patten ed. 1978). Helium-3 is also promis-
ing. See Kargel, supra note 6, and Lewis, supra note 20.29Kargel, supra note 6.30See infra note 132.31 Warren E. Leary, Craft Sees Signs of Water as Ice in Moon Craters, N.Y. TImEs, Mar.
6, 1990, at Al, A12 (noting that although "the Moon may have enough water.. to sustain lu-
nar colonies and provide fuel for rockets," experts caution that it is thinly dispersed as ice
crystals among the lunar dust and that "finding water is one thing, [but] coming up with an
economically feasible way of extracting it from a harsh and unforgiving environment is an-
other"). However, more recent date from NASA's Lunar prospector seems to indicate that
the "up to 3 billion tons of water may be buried at each [lunar] pole, most of which is con-
centrated in 2-m thick, localized deposits that make it much easier to reclaim than the thin
frost-like layer suggested by the initial analyses." HIGHLIGHTS IN SPACE: PROGRESS IN SPACE
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the Geo-Stationary Orbit ("GSO") is probably the most valuable of all
space resources to date. The GSO is a loop of space above Earth's equato-
rial surface.32 Satellites placed in GSO orbit the Earth at the same rate and
in the same direction as the Earth's rotation.33 Thus, objects in the GSO can
stay fixed above a single point on Earth's surface. The GSO's inherent use-
fulness for observation (e.g. weather, military intelligence) and communi-
cations links has led to big business. The GSO, however, limited to a
narrow band 35,800 km above the equator,34 is already cluttered, both with
electromagnetic interference from rival satellites35 -- of which there are
more than 75036 -- and with "space-junk," debris from past launches that
threatens to rip holes in the orbiting equipment.37
This problem is not limited to the GSO and the moon; in truth, every
resource is limited. The question, then, is who, if anyone, should have the
rights to the riches of space? A system of space law, if it is to be success-
ful, must provide an answer.
B. The rights of less-developed nations
The rights of less-developed nations create a concern that is both po-
litical and moral in character. As a matter of political reality, the less-
developed nations wield considerable power, due in no small part to major-
ity voting systems in the major international regulatory bodies.
Some feel, and developing nations argue, that it is morally imperative
to take the interests of the non-space-capable nations into account when de-
signing a system of space property law. A regime based on the "right of
grab," the first-come, first-served theory of property acquisition, should be
feared. By the time space-incapable nations develop the technological
prowess and capital reserves to fund meaningful development of outer
space, the earlier space-faring nations, left unchecked, might already have
locked up the most accessible and valuable resources. Present inequities of
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND APPLICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SPACE LAW,
OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, ANN. REP. 17 (1998).32Office of Technology Assessment, UNISPACE '82: A Context for International Coop-
eration and Competition 42 (1983), cited in Fred Kosmo, Note: The Commercialization of
Space: A Regulatory Scheme That Promotes Commercial Ventures and International Re-
sponsibility, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1988).33 1d.
34 1d.
35Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 AM. J. INT'L. L. 444,
445 (1979), cited in Kosmo, supra note 32, at 1059-1060.36Jonathan McDowell, The Harvard Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, (visited April
20, 1998), <http://hea-www.harvard.edu/QEDT/cm/space/jsr/geo.log/>.37 Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the 21st Century, supra note 23, at 225 (re-
marking that orbiting debris and GSO crowding are "pressing" problems that will soon esca-
late to "alarming" levels).
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global wealth distribution thus would be carried forward into the space
age.3
8
C. Protection of the environment in space and on Earth.
If protection of the environment were our only goal, perhaps the best
rule would be to forbid humankind from expanding beyond Earth, whether
personally or by mechanical proxy. But restricting ourselves to Earth is not
on the table. Current debate on humanity's future vis-a-vis space does not
regard such a policy, however noble, as a possibility.
Nevertheless, protection of the environment in space ranks high on the
list of policies to be considered. 39 The importance of an environmentalist
ethos in this context derives, in part, from the concerns we already deal with
on Earth: the preservation of the natural environment for its own sake and
for our communal survival, as well as the conservation of natural resources.
Other environmental concerns particular to space exist also. Orbiting litter
may soon seriously hinder our ability to maintain a global communications
link. Waste disposal and resource maintenance techniques may determine
whether the moon's limited water supply will be contaminated and the
moon will remain a dead satellite. Environmental considerations are, and
must be, a factor in any system of space law.
The root causes of Earth's environmental problems are limited re-
sources, limited waste disposal sites, and limited living space. Commercial
development of space might be an effective solution. If minerals are ex-
tracted from dead asteroids floating through our solar system, perhaps there
would be one less strip-mined rain forest. If solar energy is captured and
beamed down to Earth's electric grid, that could be one less oil spill in our
oceans. And if other worlds are colonized, then overpopulation can be al-
layed, possibly forever. But we are left with the question: "Which legal re-
gime will best satisfy the needs of the terrestrial and extraterrestrial
environments?"
ImI. CURRENT LAW AND ITS PROBLEMS
The United Nations' Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
("COPUOS") has developed the current law of space, such as it is, in a se-
31lnterestingly, the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), an international
body with the duty of assigning Geostationary Orbit ("GSO") positions and communications
frequencies, operates on what is basically a first-come, first-served basis. The ITU permits
anyone to place a satellite in the GSO as long as it does not interfere with an existing satel-
lite. Although the ITU, at the insistence of developing nations, has modified slightly the
system so that the GSO needs of all nations should be considered, the principle remains the
same. Kosmo, supra note 32, at 1062-1063.39See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13, at 126 et seq.
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ries of treaties.40 Any look at the property law of outer space must begin
with the Outer Space Treaty ("OST"). The OST was the first binding inter-
national agreement on the law of space, and it still provides the guiding
principles of space property law.4' One-hundred and two nations, including
the United States and Russia, ratified the OST,42 and this wide acceptance
has given it the character of binding international law even on those coun-
tries who have not ratified it.
As we have seen, the OST was born, along with most other space law,
in the context of Cold War paranoia. The "value" of space law, according
to Robert Crane, the then-Director of the Duke University Space Institute,
was "as an instrument to deny control of outer space to any single power.' 43
In our post-Cold War world, old rivalries and simple inertia must not be
permitted to prop up a legal system. We must take a fresh look at the Outer
Space Treaty, and re-write it.
The Outer Space Treaty's take on property law is oddly conflicted. On
the one hand, the OST seems to endorse some property rights in space. At
the very least, it pays lip service to the "exploration and use" of outer space
in its Preamble and Article I.
On the other hand, the OST declares that all such exploration and use
"shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irre-
spective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be
the province of all mankind.'" 4 Thus the Outer Space Treaty seems to ac-
knowledge the rights of nations and persons to exploit space, but subjects it
to vague qualifications about benefiting all nations and mankind generally.
It is from these vague qualifications that thorny problems arise. What
does the OST mean by permitting use of space only for the "benefit...of all
countries?" Will the United Nations step in and seize the profits derived
from private use of space, if it determines that the usage has not benefited
all nations?
40The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 22 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389;
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (hereinafter the Moon Treaty), G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 77,
U.N. Doc. A34/46 (1979).41The Moon Treaty, supra note 40, explores space property law more deeply. However,
it has only been ratified by nine nations, and by none of the major space powers. See Multi-
lateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, U.N. ST/LEG/SER.E/15 p. 883
(1997). It therefore lacks the necessary legitimacy to be considered binding international
law. For more discussion of the Moon Treaty, see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.42 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 439 (1997).43 ROBERT D. CRANE, PLANNINO FOR SPACE LEGAL POLICY 1 (1961).
44Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22, Art. I.
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There is widespread disagreement regarding the force of this phrase.
One school interprets the phrase as being no more than a non-binding guide,
a moral exhortation, for each state party. 5
Others read "for the benefit...of all countries" as packing a powerful
legal mandate. The characteristic hermeneutic arising from "fear by the
have-not nations' 6 is to read this phrase in light of the Moon Treaty.47
Those who hold this interpretive position, hostile to private property rights
and national sovereignty in space,48 see the two Conventions as requiring
that a system be imposed whereby all development is undertaken by a uni-
fied international organization, with profits spread amongst all nations
without regard to involvement.49 So it was, that during the negotiation of
the Moon Treaty, the Group of 77 demanded a share of all earnings from
space enterprises.5
This reading is not exclusive to developing nations. In fact, evidence
indicates that the U.S. Senate, while debating whether to ratify the OST,
also understood this phrase to require an equitable division of space-borne
wealth among all nations.51 The validity of this interpretation of "for the
benefit...of all countries" is strengthened by language in U.N. Resolution
1962-XVIII 2 Adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, Resolution
1962-XVIII helped form the basis of the OST. The Resolution states that
4 5See, e.g. Kosmo, supra note 32, at 1067. See also Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 74 (1967).46Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the 21st Century, supra note 23, at 229.
47The Moon Treaty, completed in 1979, was meant to clarify the Outer Space Treaty, es-
pecially with regard to property law. Some of the Moon Treaty's more radical language in-
cludes: Article 11: "The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind... Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon.. .shall become property of
any state." Article 4: Allocations of property, if they are to occur, must heed "the need to
promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social.. .development."
The Moon Treaty thus rejects wealth maximization in favor of wealth redistribution. The
Moon Treaty, supra note 40. The Moon Treaty was championed by the developing nations,
but has not yet been signed by any of the space powers.48 Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the 21st Century, supra note 23, at 230.
49This philosophy is followed primarily by the Group of 77, in whose view ownership of
all space property would vest in an international body which would oversee its use. Husby,
supra note 24, at 370, citing GEORGE S. RoBINsoN & HAROLD M. WHrrE, JR., ENvOYS OF
MANKIND 186 (1986). It is this ideology that the Moon Treaty was meant to support.50Davidson, supra note 11.
51 The Staff Report to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences wrote, in its
commentary on Article I, "International cooperation rather than national rivalry is the policy
adopted for exploring and using the outer space environment. Instead of space activities
being regarded as a monopoly of those nations able to afford the expense of launching satel-
lites, all nations are to share in the benefits of space exploration without regard to their level
of economic or scientific development." Staff Report, supra note 25, at 22 (emphasis added).52Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Dec. 13, 1963, reprinted in J. E. S. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE 69 (1968).
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the "use of outer space should be carried on for the betterment of mankind
and for the benefit of States irrespective of their degree of economic or sci-
entific development., 53 It is not unreasonable to understand this language,
with its strong egalitarian flavor, as requiring that we read "for the bene-
fit...of all countries" as creating a legal mandate for wealth redistribution.
Such a system would likely devastate the development of space. An
international body -- a necessarily political body -- would determine what
degree of wealth sharing is fair to "all countries. 54 The parties that take the
initiative to create and improve technology, and take the financial and
physical risks that are part and parcel of the pioneering development of
space, would be required to defer to international political consensus. Must
all development be held hostage while this cumbersome commission is de-
signed, negotiated, and ratified? Might not such a system be more politics-
driven than profit-driven, inevitably leading to inefficient pork-barreling?
Should private parties worry that profits earned at great personal risk, ex-
pense, and effort be stripped and spread, equitably or otherwise, "for the
benefit...of all countries?" It is no wonder that the Moon Treaty, which rep-
resents the apex of the philosophy of forced wealth sharing, was opposed by
both the United States and the Soviet Union, and has been ratified by only
nine relatively minor nations.55
The Outer Space Treaty also states, in article I, that space is "the
province of all mankind." In what way does this phrase limit the ways that
space can be explored and used? The difficulty is that "mankind" is not a
defined term in international law. 6 As Adrian Buekling observes, the use
of the term "mankind" causes "the relevant clauses of the Space Treaty [to]
offer little guidance as to what states may derive from them. Neither can it
be satisfactorily established what rights a state not involved in space explo-
ration might have in the achievements of the space powers. '7
The U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea ("LOS") describes the
deep sea-bed in similar terms, as the "common heritage of mankind."58 The
meaning of this clause, similar in wording and character to that in the OST,
is likewise unclear; "depending on the interpretation accepted, the unilateral
531d. (Emphasis added).
54Husby, supra note 24, at 371-372.55Australia, Austria, Chile, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines,
and Uruguay have ratified the treaty. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary
General, supra note 41. See also Davidson, supra note 11.56Husby, supra note 24, at 364.
57 Adrian Buekling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind Provisions" of the
Space Treaty, 7 J. SPACE L. 15, 20 (1980).58Convention of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
For more on the Law of the Sea, see infra notes 94 through 102 and accompanying text.
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exploitation of the resources of the deep sea-bed may or may not be permis-
sible... '59
The OST goes on, in article II, to specify that nations are forbidden
from "appropriating" any part of outer space, whether by "claim of sover-
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." The OST
thus attempts to draw a line between appropriation of outer space territory,
which article II forbids, and the exploitation of that same territory, which
article I permits. Glenn Reynolds and Robert Merges believe that the "the
restrictions of Article 2's no-sovereignty provision...do not bar the exploi-
tation of space resources, but merely the staking of exclusive claims to
tracts of celestial bodies or space."' 6 But, as H. G. Darwin notes in his
groundbreaking article, "many types of 'use' or 'exploitation'...are incon-
ceivable without appropriation of some degree at least of any materials
taken.",6' In other words, it is not at all farfetched to say that the OST actu-
ally installs a blanket prohibition on many beneficial forms of development.
Darwin's thesis can be clarified by considering a hypothetical devel-
opment project. Let's say that SpaceCorp, an imaginary U.S. corporation,
has located massive quantities of plutonium on Pluto. Having decided that
Earth's plutonium markets support the project, SpaceCorp sends up a min-
ing ship, and builds a base on Pluto above the plutonium jag. The base con-
sists of the spaceship, living quarters and life support systems, the sealed
and environment-controlled mining site, and a field of solar panels. The
company serendipitously discovers that the gravity on Pluto is perfect for
the manufacture of superconductors. A factory is built. Mining goes on for
many, many years; it is a motherlode of plutonium. More living quarters
are developed as the mine expands. A hospital is built. The work becomes
long-term, and families move onto the site. Soon there is a demand for
various services -- plumbers, a pub, a house of worship or two -- and a
Main Street develops. A school is built, along with other municipal neces-
sities. Eventually, the plutonium begins to dry up, but the superconductor
factory's business is going gangbusters, and many decide to stay. A space
colony has been born.
This, it would seem, is an ideal use of space. SpaceCorp makes
money. The miners and factory workers earn a living, as do the service
providers on Main Street. Humanity as a whole receives the benefit of
abundant plutonium, the space-manufactured superconductor component,
diminution of terrestrial mining and pollution, more jobs, and a less
59Lieutenant Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or
Arena for Unilateral Exploitation, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207 (1992), cited in Husby, supra note
24, at 368 (n.55).
60REYNOLDS & MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 10,
at 82 (discussing Carl Q. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited, 9
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 217 (1984)).
61 Darwin, supra note 27, at 282-83.
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crowded Earth. In short, everyone wins. This sort of development, I argue,
must be encouraged. At the very least it ought to be permitted.
But is it permitted? In the hypothetical Plutonian plutonium mine col-
ony, under current law, SpaceCorp, and by extension the United States,
would own the plutonium, once extracted.6Y Moreover, the United States
would have sovereign jurisdiction over the spaceships, the mining enclo-
sure, the living quarters and Main Street shops, (which, after all, are no
more than stationa spaceships under the U.S. flag), and the occupant na-
tionals themselves. 63 If an interloper tried to break through the mining en-
closure to get at the un-mined plutonium, the United States would be
justified in prosecuting for, at the very least, breaking and entering.
This illustration shows how easily usufruct turns into de facto appro-
priation.64 It is appropriation that is forbidden; long-term use and perma-
nent occupation, to the exclusion of all others, surely constitutes
appropriation.
In other words, this hypothetical example of the ideal development of
space for humanity's greater good might be exactly what the OST forbids
as "appropriation...by any other means." SpaceCorp's project, however
beneficial, seems to violate the spirit and letter of the current OST. At the
very least, excluding someone from a private factory or dwelling would be
a literal breach of the OST requirement that there be "free access to all areas
of celestial bodies. '65 As Ogunsola 0. Ogunbanwo puts it, the end result of
the restrictions the OST places on appropriation and exclusion is that
"[c]elestial bodies are incapable of occupation.' 66
This is unfortunate for the very real, if misguided, clients of Dennis
Hope's Lunar Embassy. Mr. Hope, founder of Lunar Embassy, purports to
sell 1,800-acre tracts of land on the moon for $15.99 (plus a "lunar tax"). 67
Of course, no system of property law should permit and protect Lunar Em-
bassy's "business." But there are far more serious and potentially wealth-
creating businesses, such as SpaceDev,68 that are just as jeopardized by the
OST as Mr. Hope's novelty venture.
62This is the common understanding of the right to use space guaranteed by the Outer
Space Treaty, art. I, 18 U.S.Ct. 2410, 2412.63The Outer Space Treaty, article VIII, provides that "[a] state party to the treaty on
whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and
control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celes-
tial body." (emphasis added), Id. at 2415.
6This problem is also discussed in Husby, supra note 24, at 365 et seq.65Outer Space Treaty, art. I.
66OGUNSOLA 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE AcTIVITIEs 78
(1975).




Could the OST be reinterpreted to permit long-term use? As it stands,
the Treaty leaves even the most loyal supporters of the OST in a cloud. As
OST apologist, Ogunbanwo, equivocates, the fact that the OST effectually
prohibits a "the acquisition of absolute title does not mean that States are
prohibited from exercising any rights over these areas., 69 "However," he
continues, "it must be regrettably admitted that the Space Treaty lacks defi-
nite and specific legal rules" defining these nebulous rights.70 Once again,
we have a choice between interpreting the OST as truly hostile to private
development, or merely vague.
The Outer Space Treaty is riddled with ambiguities. It is silent, outside
of affirming freedom of "exploration and use," as to what sort of rights
parties can claim in celestial bodies. It is silent as to the circumstances un-
der which these unspecified property rights might vest, that is, what a per-
son must do to gain whatever property rights are available. For example,
even as to the right of short-term usufruct (which a consensus of scholars
agree is granted by the OST), Glenn Reynolds has said,
Suppose you land your spacecraft on Mars and your little robot drives
around and picks up stuff. Does that mean you own Mars? Nah, that seems
unreasonable, to claim a whole planet. But could you claim, say, that you own
the [resources within a] quarter of a square mile in which your robot rolled
around? The exact size of it is uncertain."
A legal system that is unclear as to the rights of developers in the land
they develop is almost as prohibitive of positive development as a system
forbidding development altogether. A SpaceCorp-type company will not
spend the millions, perhaps billions, of dollars it would take to travel to the
ends of the solar system and develop a mine, a factory, and a colony, if the
governing law is unclear as to whether they may keep their plutonium and
their profits. Furthermore, the colony itself would be yanked out from un-
der them should a majority of the international community deem it not to be
in the best interests of mankind.
This was not a pressing concern in 1967, when the Outer Space Treaty
was ratified. It was perfectly acceptable at the time to consign a deeper dis-
cussion of property rights to future negotiation, as the United Nations did.72
The prospect of space development seemed distant. Now it is upon us.
And the problem is even worse. Beyond the ambiguous and oddly contra-
dictory language already noted, the OST has nothing more to say about
property law. No other binding treaty elaborates the OST's befogged law
69Ogunbanwo, supra note 66, at 69. See also GEORGE V. D'ANGELO, AEROSPACE
BUSINESS LAW 105 (1994) ("It is not clear [under the OST] whether natural resources in
space can be appropriated by a state or private entities.")7
°Id. at 68.
71 Glenn Reynolds, quoted in Davidson, supra note 11.
72 Ogunbanwo, supra note 66, at 70-71.
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of real property. We are thus left with a legal void, a wasteland of indeter-
minacy and instability.
Right now, reservoirs of great wealth sit untapped in space. Unless
people and nations are encouraged to exploit the riches of space, humanity
will never know their benefit. And the more we are able to exploit, the
more humanity stands to benefit. If commercialization is to be successful,
space law must encourage investment in outer space development. But to
do so, space law must work as a comprehensive regulatory scheme, with
maximum predictability and minimum regulatory interference, that both
rewards space development and accounts for the rights of all nations and
individual participants.73
What is needed is an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty, one that
both clarifies and expands property rights in space.
IV. PROPOSAL: APPROPRJATIVE OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY
The ideal legal regime should create maximum incentives for efficient
development of space, in recognition of the fact that the potential wealth in
space will not drop into our laps.
But as much as commercial development of space would benefit all
mankind, it is just as important that the development be controlled. We
must learn from mistakes of the past. Any legal regime should guard
against inefficient exploitation, waste, and environmental despoliation.
Furthermore, space should not become the next Wild West. Destruction
and sabotage must be discouraged.
My pioposal, which will be developed throughout this essay, is to
maximize incentives by giving developers comprehensive property rights.
Humanity's welfare demands that we alter the current law to allow real es-
tate ownership -- not just usufructary rights -- to those who would best de-
velop land in space.7 The potential wealth of outer space, in the form of
minerals, energy, living space, etc., doesn't do us any good unless we are
able to harness it. And, as Jeffrey Kargel, a planetary scientist at the U.S.
Geological Survey, has written, "if you want to cross the bridge into the
21st century of space [development], then space must pay its way and give
private investors a handsome early return on investment. ' 75
What do we mean by "ownership?" Property is commonly recognized
as being a "bundle" of disparate rights regulating relations between people
with respect to things. The bundle of rights can be unpacked. It includes:
the right to possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to
transfer.76 These rights are not on/off affairs; they can each be limited or
73 Kosmo, supra note 32, at 1057-1058.
74Of course, this rule must be limited, as will be discussed below.75 Kargel, supra note 6.76 JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed., 1993).
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expanded along a continuum. I use the term "ownership" to describe a state
of affairs wherein a person has all four of these rights to their maximum
extent with respect to a piece of property.
Current space law ostensibly respects the right to use real property in
space and to collect and own its fruits. Historically, this has been known as
the usufructary right.77 But the current law doesn't even provide this right
freely; it seems to be limited by several clauses of the Outer Space Treaty(e.g. use "for the benefit...of all countries").78
Nor does the OST recognize the right to exclude, as is evidenced by
article I's prohibition on appropriating what it recognizes as being "the
province of all mankind," the guarantee in the same article of "free access
to all areas of celestial bodies," and article XII's requirement that "[a]ll sta-
tions [and] installations...shall be open to representatives of other States
Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity." Likewise, as illuminated in
the SpaceCorp hypothetical, the prohibition on appropriation seems to ne-
gate a long-term right of possession. Without the right to exclude or pos-
sess, of course, a legal system need not provide the right to transfer real
estate. Anyone else may simply help themselves. In sum, the OST de-
mands that "[n]o State can obtain such possessions as will entitle it to claim
ownership or sovereignty over them... There can be no exclusive appro-
priation of [celestial bodies] and any part thereof as a result of their
'use'..." 79 Under current law, space cannot be owned.
A new law of space real property must enliven and support all four
rights that comprise ownership.
First, there must be a right to permanent possession: barring some ex-
traordinary circumstance or the enforcement of a judgment, no one should
face dispossession of his real estate on Earth or in space. This rule supplies
a needed measure of certainty, in two ways: (1) it's a definite rule and al-
most any such rule is better than the fogginess of the current regime, and (2)
it moves the presumption away from public conversion of private lands, and
therefore makes it clear that the OST's statement, that space development
must be "for the benefit...of all countries," is a moral exhortation and not a
loophole through which the United Nations can dispossess a private party of
his site.
Second, I suggest that the right to use be unlimited, except by envi-
ronmental regulations and the developer's domestic law. This rule is a rec-
ognition that humanity's fortune is best enhanced not by a centralized
command-and-control system, but by private development making market-
driven decisions.
77 L. F. E. Goldie, Note: Title and Use (and Usufruct) - an Ancient Distinction Too Oft
Forgot, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 691-692 (1985).78Outer Space Treaty, supra note 22, art. I.79 Ogunbanwo, supra note 66, at 78.
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Like the right to perpetual possession, the third right -- the right to ex-
clude -- creates the certainty vital to an optimal investment environment.
As noted, the current system precludes such a right, for it would certainly
run afoul of the prohibition on appropriation and the requirement that there
be "free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 80 Without the right to ex-
clude, however, pioneer investors would be at the mercy of free riders. Af-
ter investing countless hours in (or paying someone else for) a survey of the
real estate, after setting up a mining colony at great expense, the pioneer
would have no recourse if another party took advantage of the pioneer's re-
search and began a copycat mine on the very same site. So the right to ex-
clude must form a part of the new legal system.
Finally, the right to transfer must accompany the rights of exclusion
and perpetual possession. The Coase Theorem of economics tells us that, in
a legal environment supportive of bargaining, property rights will be allo-
cated to the party who values them most, i.e. the most efficient user of the
property.81 When transaction costs are high enough to prevent bargaining,
property rights only end up in the most productively efficient hands if the
law happens to initially assign them that way.82 Without any right to trans-
fer, transaction costs are infinite, and no bargaining can occur. In order to
avoid the inevitably inefficient solutions of a command-and-control regime
of property usage, the right to transfer -- alienability -- must be a part of our
system.83
All these rights together -- possession, use, exclusion, and transfer --
make up ownership. And it is ownership that the modem law of space real
property needs.
A. Three Arguments for Ownership
Space is an international zone, and so is, in a sense, the heritage of all
humanity. We must not forget, when considering the governance of outer
space, that the rules should first and foremost attempt to maximize the
benefit to all humankind. So, ideally, celestial bodies should be put to the
uses most beneficial to humanity. This is guaranteed by a system that puts
land in the hands of those for whom the territory is most profitable. It is a
matter of elementary economic theory. Whoever can use a site to human-
ity's greatest benefit will be the one who can profit most from the site;
whoever can profit most from the site will be the one for whom the site is
most valuable. Thus the person who can put a site to humanity's greatest
soOuter Space Treaty, art. 1.
s' ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMIcs 78-84 (2nd ed., 1997).2Id. at 84-87.
83 Furthermore, costs of bargaining should be reduced as much as possible, to minimize
the possibility that transaction costs would inhibit the most efficient user from owning a site.
Possible treatments of this potential problem are considered infra at section VI.
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benefit will be the one willing to spend the most to own the site.84 This is
the bargain theory of economics, and will form the basis for all that follows.
1. Ownership will reduce wasteful use
Ownership, and the attendant right of alienability, would promote the
efficient use of space resources.
Again, a hypothetical will help illustrate: a Martian site has been iden-
tified as being rich with manganese and silicon. Manganese Mining Co.("M.M.Co."), interested in the manganese and the manganese alone, de-
cides to send up a team of miners. They begin operations, develop shipping
routes, and build a sustainable mining colony.Without the right of ownership, M.M.Co. has no reason not to blast
through and obliterate silicon deposits in order to more quickly uncover the
manganese. Furthermore, once the manganese is depleted, there is no rea-
son for them to leave the colony's structures and life support systems intact.
If, on the other hand, space law grants ownership to M.M.Co., then
M.M.Co. has incentive to act with greater over-all efficiency. There is in-
centive to preserve the silicon deposits, because silicon will increase the
amount for which Silicon Mining Co. ("S.M.Co.") is willing to purchase the
site from M.M.Co. Along similar lines, there is also incentive to preserve
the shipping routes and the colony structures and life support systems.
So M.M.Co. receives the benefit of the manganese deposits, and is
further rewarded for developing the mining colony and transportation
routes, and for preserving the silicon deposits and the colony itself when it
sells the site. Because M.M.Co. owned the site, there would be reason for it
to prospect for silicon and advertise its presence to interested parties, even
though M.M.Co. did not itself have an interest in mining the silicon. Thus
S.M.Co. receives the benefit of M.M.Co.'s mineralogical research.
S.M.Co. also need not waste resources setting up new routes, mines, and
colonies; it could purchase them intact.
Under such a system, people are better rewarded for pioneering efforts
and pioneers have incentive to research and preserve that which they find
and build. The second-comers receive the benefit of the pioneers' efforts;
they need not reinvent the wheel. And, in the end, people on Earth receive
the benefit of plentiful manganese and silicon, instead of, as would result in
a non-ownership system, just manganese.
2. The right to transfer (alienability) would compensate for positive exter-
nalities, thereby creating added incentive to productively develop space
Another advantage of an ownership regime over a use regime can be
found in the following hypothetical situation. Suppose the bark of a tree
4 Cooter and Ulen, supra note 81, at 72-74.
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found only deep in the Amazon has cancer-curing properties. Whoever first
attempts to harvest the tree bark would be required to build a road to the
grove, at tremendous expense. All subsequent pharmaceutical harvesters
would have use of the road and consequently be able to turn a much larger
profit on the harvested bark. The problem arises, then, that no company
would want to make the costly first trek.
What problem does this situation present? Because, since no company
would rationally sacrifice itself in the quest for bark, the rest of us will have
to do without this life-saving cure.
The cause of the problem is an uncompensated positive externality.
The right of use does not, by itself, reward the first company for the posi-
tive externality it produces, i.e., the road.
One way of rewarding that first company's pioneering effort would be
to grant it ownership of the grove. So if company A made the first trek to
the grove, the right of ownership would let them decide whether to utilize
their exclusive rights to the trees in perpetuity, or to sell the grove to com-
pany B for a price that accounts for the expense of building the road. Either
way, ownership allows company A to internalize the positive externality.
The same problem exists in space development. The early developers
will encounter huge costs, many of which will produce positive externalities
(e.g. improved site assaying techniques). In space, as in the jungle, owner-
ship rights can help a company internalize its positive external effects.
3. Colonization
Colonization might be necessary to long-term and far-reaching devel-
opment of space. Additionally, colonization can help solve one of our most
pressing problems: overpopulation of the Earth. There cannot be viable,
long-term colonization if property law does not permit ownership -- and the
certainty it imparts -- of the territory on which the colony stands.
V. THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
A. Problem: Would additional incentive to develop space unleash
environmental havoc?
The current space law governing environmental responsibilities is
well-meaning, but not effective enough. It is composed of OST article VII
and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (the "Liability Convention"). Article VII of the OST asserts that
[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of
an object into outer space is internationally liable for damage to another State
Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object...
85 See supra note 40.
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The Liability Convention limits liability to "fault."
Space environmental law, as it stands under these two treaties, is
deeply flawed. The Liability Convention supplies no definition of fault.
Both treaties refer only to harms caused by launched objects; while these
might be interpreted to include harms caused by unlaunched installations
constructed on celestial bodies, such an interpretation is by no means cer-
tain. 6 A detailed dispute resolution procedure neither has been described
nor has arisen.87 Even if the liability standards fashioned by these two trea-
ties can remedy localized and evidentiarily attributable injuries, they cannot
redress those harms which are communal or otherwise unattributable.88
One reason for the inadequacy of the current law might be that its for-
mulators did not correctly foresee the course space development would
take. The approach taken by the OST and Liability Convention resonates
with the expectation that space activity would remain limited to periodic
governmental exploratory missions.89 I suggest two ways to bring space
environmental law into the modem space age of ubiquitous commercial ac-
tivity.
First of all, an approval process, overseen by an international organi-
zation, must precede any actual development. This would be similar in
function to the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), an or-
ganization whose most essential duty is to certify that proposed communi-
cations satellites will not interfere with each other.90 Any party wishing to
engage in the development of space would first present a proposal to the
overseeing organization. The organization would then only grant project
approval after an environmental review, ensuring that the project complies
with environmental standards agreed to by COPUOS.
Making approval dependent on environmental compliance does not de-
stroy the dual goals of efficient usage and wealth maximization. Far from
it. Environmental safeguards embody the recognition that environmental
degradation harms humanity in very real ways: it can endanger our health
and lives, and can ruin a site's utility. It doesn't bear belaboring this point;
an example should suffice. Without environmental precautions, a mining
corporation might dirty a distant planet's lone water supply, forever dead-
ening a world that might have grown into a great and productive colony.
Similar has happened on Earth many times. It can happen in space.
Another way to solve the problem of space environmental ruination is
by accepting the right of ownership into our system of space law. It would
be a simple but effective step in the right direction. As Lawrence Roberts




90H. L. VAN TRAA-ENGELMAN, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE 83 (1993).
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has written, the current law "is rather damaging from an environmental per-
spective," because "without a means to secure control of a resource in the
ground," i.e. without ownership, "each individual developer will seek to
maximize his or her own gain by extracting as much value as quickly as
possible without regard to the effect on the communal resource. 9 '
Ownership creates a strong incentive to act with an environmentalist
ethos. As owner of a site, SpaceCorp would want to maximize the site's
value. This self-interest protects the environment in two related ways.
First, because SpaceCorp is not just a squatter on a plot of celestial territory,
because it will have more than an expiring usufructary interest, SpaceCorp
will avoid wanton despoliation of the land. Despoliation would reduce the
value of the property to a purchaser, and thus SpaceCorp's potential reve-
nue. Poor land management might also harm SpaceCorp's current interests,
if its actions contaminate its own site to the point that its settlement loses
viability. Second, SpaceCorp will avoid ripping through the site; instead, it
will either preserve materials it does not use to maximize the site's resale
value, or it will itself use the site as fully and efficiently as possible.
SpaceCorp will either use the site with preservationist techniques, sparing
the site from wasteful destruction, or it will use the site as a conservationist,
i.e. wholly and completely, sparing other sites from exploitation. The in-
centive to use space non-wastefully, discussed above in the context of eco-
nomic efficiency, clearly has positive environmental repercussions. An
owner has an interest in keeping his own site clean, as well as using it with
minimal waste and maximum efficiency, because if he wants to eventually
sell the property, any despoliation will devalue it. This carrot, because it is
self-executing, is better than any stick.
Of course, the right of ownership would not make an environmental
violation whose harm extends onto another site less likely -- but it wouldn't
make it more likely, either. As under the current system, lawsuits should
still be available to remedy harms. Hopefully the requirement of environ-
mental review would act as a prior restraint to prevent these harms. And
ownership, by creating an incentive to care about one's own property, pro-
tects the interests of others: both those nearby (who instantly feel the effects
of more care given to, e.g., waste disposal and water management), and
those who come later.
B. Problem: What about the concerns of developing nations?
Developing nations have reason to oppose incorporating rights of own-
ership into the property regimes governing international zones. First, de-
veloping nations do not want to be permanently disadvantaged just because
they lag in space-capability right now. This is an extremely potent critique,
and will be discussed momentarily.
91Roberts, supra note 13, at 141.
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The second rationale is more historical. It is a deep-seated distrust of
colonial imperialist doctrine such as that which the world faced in previous
centuries. It is a readily understandable distrust: most, if not all developing
nations were harmed by European nations who treated the non-European
lands as theirs for the taking.
The difference here, however, is that there are no (known) occupants
native to outer space.92 The colonialist "right of grab" policy was morally
objectionable because it ignored the property rights (and other rights) of
those already occupying the "discovered" lands.93 In the absence of prior
existing property rights, however, there seems to be nothing inherently im-
moral about a right of grab.
Except, perhaps, that it may severely disadvantage the lower-tech na-
tions in future. Developing nations fear that by the time they gain the
wealth and technology necessary to become players in the space game, the
most readily available resources will have already been claimed as private
property and be under sovereign control of other nations. The developing
nations argue that they will again be left in the economic lurch. This argu-
ment against a right-of-grab-based system gains salience when one consid-
ers that the reason the developing nations are not yet space-capable may
well be attributable to past wrongs the developed nations inflicted on them.
The perpetuation of past wrongs thus makes the right of grab doubly objec-
tionable in the eyes of developing nations.
There are two short answers to this concern. First, the universe, for
practical purposes, is not finite. Whenever developing nations become
space-capable, there will be plenty of available unused space real estate.
Second, corporations based in space-incapable nations could, of course,
contract out to a space launch company from a space-capable nation. De-
veloping nations can take advantage of space development without them-
selves being space-capable.
Perhaps less straightforward is the notion that ownership rights, by in-
centivizing the development of outer space, would fund intense R&D of
launch technology. Launches would become more reliable and cheaper. In
this way, ownership rights might hasten the day that developing nations are
able to afford hiring a launch company, or even to have their own space
programs (see infra section VII (b)).
Nevertheless, developing nations will likely continue to oppose rights
of ownership in space. This is a political problem, and requires a political
solution. For further discussion on this point, see section VII, infra.
We can learn how not to solve the problem from the legal and diplo-
matic wrangling that has been going on regarding mining of Earth's deep
92If humans ever come into contact with intelligent extra-terrestrial life, much of our
space law, and human thought as we know it, will have to be revised.
93As we shall see, there are also economic reasons to oppose an unfettered right of grab.
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seabed. Exploitation of the deep seabed, like exploitation of space, is a very
risky and expensive proposition. And the deep seabed, like space, is con-
sidered an international zone. In December, 1982, 120 nations signed the
LOS.94 The LOS establishes an "Authority" and an "Enterprise." 95 Mining
companies must receive approval from the Authority. Approval, in the
form of a license, is only granted if the applicant company satisfies a set of
rigorous conditions. The applicant must present two sites of equal value,
one of which will be reserved by the Authority for development by the En-
terprise.96 The applicant must fully disclose information regarding mining
equipment, methods, and technology.97 The applicant must pay an initial
sum of $500,000, an annual fee of $1 million until production begins, and
(once mining has begun) either $1 million or a percentage of the market
value of recovered materials, whichever is greater.9 Finally, and in addi-
tion to any domestic taxes incurred, the Authority levies 35 to 70 percent of
the net profits.99
The United States, along with several other industrialized nations in-
cluding the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, and
the Soviet Union, refused to ratify the LOS because of the deep seabed
mining provisions.'0° There was a strong perception that the treaty's harsh
regulations were an attempt to ruin commercial mining projects that would
be in potential competition with the dry-land mines of developing nations.
As Marne A. Dubs, spokesperson on seabed mining for the American Min-
ing Congress, saw it, if the LOS was enforced "there will be no U.S. ocean
mining industry."'O' Instead, the United States passed a domestic law, the
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which recognized the rights of
U.S. mining ventures to the full profits of their labors. 02
If space law follows the LOS's lead and asks developed nations to
make similarly-excessive sacrifices for the benefit of developing nations,
the same political impasse with the resultant disparate and incoherent legal
regimes will no doubt reoccur.
94Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, U.N. ST/LEG/SER.E/15
(1997).
95LOS, supra note 58, at arts. 137(2), 153, 156-57, 170.
96 Id. at annex III, arts. 8, 9.
971d. at art. 5.
9S1d. at art. 13.
99 Id.
looKosmo, supra note 32, at 1077.
101 Marne A. Dubs, quoted in Van Dyke & Yuen, 'Common Heritage"v. 'Freedom of the
High Seas ." Which Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 493, 496 (1982), cited in
Kosmo, supra note 32, at 1077.
102 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1605 (1980); see also
Reynolds, supra note 23, at 234.
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C. Problem: Would ownership rights create inappropriate incentives,
leading to inefficient development?
Any property system based on the right of the first comer creates artifi-
cial value unrelated to the property's inherent worth. This skews the eco-
nomic efficiencies of the market. We might call this the "get it while you
can" problem. 10 3 A concrete example might help explain. Suppose a site is
worth $1 million. CorpA, operating alone, would not commence on a mis-
sion to exploit the site until it felt that there was enough demand, and cheap
enough exploitation technology, to carry the mission out. However, oper-
ating in competition with CorpB and CorpC, CorpA will recognize that it
might not be able to harness the site's value at all if CorpB or CorpC get to
the site first. Thus CorpA will feel compelled to zoom up to the site, using
today's less efficient technology, simply because of the artificial value of
being the first-in-time.
Does the possibility that an ownership-based property regime that
could lead to less efficient development mean that we should reject such a
system? I believe the answer is no, for two reasons. First, the most effi-
cient and effective way to spur the development of better space technology
is to encourage private commercial space flights. Government funding was
no doubt needed at the inception of the space program, because there was
no understanding of space's commercial value. Now, however, tremendous
amounts of private money are being invested in space-oriented projects, '04
and that's without ownership rights. Ownership rights would speed up
space development, which would pump even more money into space tech-
nology R&D. Furthermore, money would go to R&D in needed areas, not
pork-barrel projects. The industry could become self-sufficient, free of the
need for government funding. Pioneering space flights may have many
positive externalities, but this would be perhaps the most important one of
all. So even though the prospect of ownership might stimulate some early
space projects into a premature, and less efficient, start-date than would
otherwise be the case, these early endeavors bring the future of space tech-
nology a great deal closer to the present.
Second, it is impossible to know, ex ante, how much space flight tech-
nology will improve. Surely hindsight will show that development could
have achieved greater efficiency, in some cases, by waiting five years. On
the other hand, should property law let a governmental authority force a
company to wait five, ten, or fifty years on a project on the belief that fu-
sion engines are just around the corner? If fusion engines never materialize,
humanity will have been deprived for no reason. Do we wish to put the de-
'
03Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource
Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 J. INTL. Bus. 727, 757 (1986) (using the phrase in a some-
what different context).
1 Highlights 1996, supra note 1, at 1.
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cision in the hands of a centralized politics-driven authority, who has no
personal stake in the development projects? No. It is better to let individ-
ual companies, experts in their fields, decide when to take risks and when to
wait for improved technology.
D. Problem: Will the right of ownership, by creating an additional
incentive, lead to inefficient development?
When thinking about inefficient development, we need not worry
about the possibility that a company might spend more money on a project
than it eventually earns. Although this net loss might be termed "ineffi-
cient" for the company to have undertaken, we need not be concerned.
We should assume, as a starting point, that companies will act ration-
ally, in their best interests. A company would not rationally engage in a
development project if it expected a net loss. Let's say that CorpA expected
a net profit, but, to their dismay, the project was a net loser. This is still of
no concern, because all that has occurred is a transfer of wealth within the
system. CorpA's revenue (money it took in from consumerA, consumerB,
et al.) was less than its costs (money it paid to supplierA, supplierB, et al.)
Humanity, as a whole, has not lost anything; wealth has merely been shifted
around.
However, there is a means by which a project can decrease humanity's
total wealth. When SpaceCorp buys rocket fuel from CorpB, nothing has
been lost to the system; that's a wealth transfer. But when SpaceCorp
bums the rocket fuel, they've depleted humanity's wealth. That fuel is
gone, lost to the system. Humanity's aggregate wealth has declined by ex-
actly as much as the value of the unrecyclable materials that were ex-
hausted. From this we can derive a meaningful definition of "inefficient
development." In a mining context, a legal system operates inefficiently if
the prospect of ownership leads SpaceCorp to expend more of humanity's
wealth (fuel, unreusable rockets, human capital, etc.) than it extracts as ore.
Since we are concerned with creating a legal system that maximizes the to-
tal social welfare, increasing humanity's aggregate wealth as much as pos-
sible, we should be concerned if the legal system encourages inefficient
projects, i.e. projects that cause humanity's aggregate wealth to decline.
But can ownership rights really cause inefficiencies? Another example
will help illustrate why they cannot. Assume that ownership rights are as-
signed on a "right of grab" basis. Let's say that $1 billion of uranium has
been found on Uranus. It costs $2 billion in fuel to make the journey. But
CorpA decides that ownership of the Uranian plot is worth $1.1 billion over
and above the value of the ore; that is to say, CorpA believes that it can sell
the site to CorpB for that amount after the uranium has been extracted. Or-
dinarily we are not concerned about costs of projects (the salaries, the raw
materials, the taxes), because wealth is merely being transferred from one
party to another. However, we can see, in the example, that CorpA will use
$2 billion of Earth's resources (the fuel), and only return $1 billion (the
Owning Outer Space
20:59 (1999)
uranium). With these numbers, the system has lost a net of $1 billion. And
this loss, it seems, has been caused by the right of ownership. Without
ownership rights, CorpA would never have undertaken the project, as it
would have lost money. But with ownership rights, the project, seemingly
inefficient to the Earth as a whole, becomes profitable to CorpA. To put it
more generally, the incentives created by rights of ownership seem to make
projects profitable to individuals, even though the project delivers a net loss
to the world's wealth.
But this inefficiency is an economic illusion. A false assumption has
been made: that ownership has "artificial" value inherent. The fact is, rights
of ownership can have no value outside of what it's worth to mankind, so-
called "real" value. That is, SpaceCorp's ownership rights will not be
worth $1.1 billion, or anything at all for that matter, unless someone else is
willing to purchase the site for that amount. And, of course, no one will
purchase the land unless it contains something of value to humanity, e.g.
another type of mineral.
Another example may help. Again assume ownership is achieved by
right of grab. An asteroid contains manganese and silicon deposits worth
$1 and $3 billion respectively. Fuel costs to the asteroid are $1.5 billion per
round trip. Manganese Mining Co. (M.M.Co.), expert only in mining man-
ganese, is able to secure ownership rights to the asteroid. Without owner-
ship rights, it has no cause to make the journey; it will not waste $1.5
billion in fuel to retrieve $1 billion in manganese. However, Silicon Min-
ing Co. (S.M.Co.) values the asteroid at ($3 billion of silicon) - ($1.5 billion
fuel) = $1.5 billion. Thus, with ownership rights, M.M.Co. can sell the as-
teroid's remains to S.M.Co. for a split-profit price of $0.75 billion. This
gives M.M.Co. a $0.25 billion profit, and leaves S.M.Co. $0.75 billion in
the black. Both projects would happen, but there's no inefficiency: $4 bil-
lion of ore is gained at a cost of $3 billion of fuel = $1 billion increase in
humanity?s total social welfare. What if fuel costs were higher? If a round
trip cost $2.5 billion, would M.M.Co. acquire ownership rights to the aster-
oid? Not unless it could sell the property rights for ($2.5 billion of fuel) -
($1 billion of manganese) = $1.5 billion. Which M.M.Co. could not do:
S.M.Co. would only be willing to bargain to a maximum of ($3 billion of
silicon) - ($2.5 billion of fuel) = $.5 billion. M.M.Co. could not profitably
sell ownership rights, and consequently would have no incentive to "grab"
the asteroid. With M.M.Co. out of the picture, S.M.Co. could acquire sole
ownership and make a $0.5 billion profit. There is a principle at work here,
analogous to physics' Conservation of Momentum. The right of ownership
cannot cause humanity's aggregate wealth to decline.
On the other hand, although the right of ownership can't cause ineffi-
cient development, it can cause what seems to be less efficient behavior. In
the examples just given, humanity is enriched by M.M.Co. and S.M.Co.'s
projects. However, humanity would have been even better off had
M.M.Co. not done anything. In each case, our total social welfare would
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:59 (1999)
have had a greater net increase had S.M.Co. acted alone. It was only the
right of ownership that led M.M.Co. to execute what is not, in itself, a fruit-
ful mining venture.
There are several responses to this. First, space exploitation, in the
long run, is aided by increased spending in space travel. Although
M.M.Co.'s operation did not increase humanity's aggregate wealth, it did
inject money into the space flight industry. This increased demand, if on a
large scale, might spur more companies to become space flight suppliers.
Increased competition will bring about an increased investment in research
and development. The more money we pump into space flight in the near
term, the more efficient space flight will be in the long term. Also, not to
beat a dead horse, but M.M.Co.'s venture will likely bear other positive
externalities as well. Together, these side effects of hastened development
will likely more than make up for any ownership-driven efficiency losses.
Second, bargaining theory might turn aside much of the weight of this
critique. If M.M.Co. was in a position to secure ownership of an asteroid
by engaging in an unprofitable mining venture, a conversation between
M.M.Co. and S.M.Co. might go like this:
M.M.Co.: "We know the asteroid is worth $3 billion to you. We
have a fast new ship, so we'll get there first and grab ownership.
When we're finished extracting the manganese, we'll be willing to sell
the asteroid to you for, oh, $1.5 billion?"
S.M.Co.: "Look, first of all, why should you get all the profits?
Clearly we should meet somewhere in the middle, say, at $0.75 billion.
But why should we go on with this charade? Let's speak frankly. We
know that there's not enough manganese on the asteroid to make up for
your fuel costs. The only reason you're planning to mine the manga-
nese is so that you can attain ownership of the asteroid and sell it to us.
I have a better idea. Why don't we pay you not to fly up there at all?"
M.M.Co.: "You mean, avoid the danger and hassle of space flight,
and not waste $1.5 billion of fuel to get $1 billion of manganese?"
S.M.Co.: "That's right. Of course, we wouldn't pay you $0.75
billion, because we know your total investment and risk are much
lower than what they would otherwise be. But I'm sure we can work
out a fair price."
By "buying off" M.M.Co., S.M.Co. can save money for itself. By per-
suading M.M.Co. not to pursue ownership, this buy-off also improves hu-
manity's net wealth increase.
VI. CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT: THE UNSER
SYSTEM
On what basis should ownership be awarded? The legal system's an-
swer to this question is crucial, because it determines what commercial ac-
tors will do. If the rule of ownership was no more than "first come, first
served," with ownership going to the first person to grab a celestial body, an
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unmitigated land-rush would ensue. Of course, the amount of wealth de-
pendent on being first-in-time would doubtless breed the criminality and
outright sabotage witnessed in the American West of the gold rush era.
This, along with efficiency concerns, dictates that the legal regime must not
operate on a pure principle of first come, first served.
Clearly there must be a measure of centralized organization. I am not
suggesting that private industry cede its independent judgment to an inter-
governmental command-and-control planning board. What I am suggesting
is that an international body, carrying the legitimacy of the United Nations,
coordinate private industry so that the market forces can operate most effi-
ciently. We might call it the United Nations Space Exploitation Registry,
and it might be founded on a document like this (commentary in bracketed
italics):
A. The U.N. Space Exploitation Registry ("UNSER")
1. Definitions
"Author" is defined as the person, corporation, or governmental body
that designs and plans to execute a space development project.
2. Provisions
1) Prior to commencing any use or exploitation of any part of any
celestial body, authors need to receive UNSER's approval.
[This provision is necessary to prevent a party from evading the
UNSER system. A party thus cannot, e.g., embark on an environ-
mentally hazardous project by deciding to forgo ownership and
settling for usufruct. Ownership will accompany all use, but there
will be no usage outside of UNSER regulation.]
2) UNSER will grant approval only upon
a) receiving a completed project plan,
b) reviewing the project plan to determine whether it conflicts
with any prior project,
c) reviewing the plan for environmental violations, and
[UNSER must also be enabled to perform periodic on-site checks
ofprojects, to make sure that environmental codes are being con-
tinually upheld]
d) confirming that the project plan doesn't endanger the life or
health of any person or the security interests of any nation.
3) Project plans shall be public documents, available on request.
4) A complete project plan shall include
a) a demarcation of the project site's boundaries,
b) a detailed business plan, including expected revenues and
sources of revenues, and
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:59 (1999)
[This information should include an explanation of why the proj-
ect author believes the site to be valuable. E.g., the mineral con-
tent of the site, the fact that the site is located over a quantity of
water, the fact that the site has the ideal gravity for processing
materials.]
c) a detailed description of launch technology.
[Making this information public is an important step in advancing
the space-capability of developing nations, as well as in advanc-
ing the state of the art of spaceflight overall. On the other hand,
we should probably let authors keep secret the technology specific
to space mining, colonization, energy-capture, materials proc-
essing, et al. Although such information is indubitably valuable to
developing nations, project authors might be so unwilling to give
up their trade secrets to everyone, including their industry rivals,
that they would be discouraged from undertaking the project, or
even from supporting the UNSER system in the first place.]
5) Projects shall be prioritized based solely on the date that the com-
pleted project plan is received by UNSER.
6) If the proposed project conflicts with another project, UNSER
shall refuse approval to the project submitted later-in-time.
[This provision describes UNSER's most important function: cre-
ating a public registry of prioritized space projects. In this way,
UNSER forestalls potentially conflicting projects before they pro-
gress too far. By enforcing an absolute privilege for prior proj-
ects, UNSER can help avert lawsuits and wasted funds. In other
words, the right to exclude is given to the author of the prior proj-
ect and is enforced by UNSER. The incentive to sabotage is
thereby reduced.]
7) If the author of a project does not commence on the project within
x (amount of time), then the project loses UNSER's approval.
The author may re-apply for approval, but the project will be pri-
oritized based on the date of the re-application.
[This provision is necessary to prevent parties from proposing
projects on everything in sight, just to get priority and an exclu-
sive right to develop.]
8) UNSER shall be funded by states party. The funding shall be paid
by states party in proportion to the total amount of income each
state party derives from its space projects, yearly. The total
amount of income each state party derives from its space projects
shall be calculated as the sum of all net income (post-expenses)
earned by all authors, both governmental and private, located
within the state.
Obviously, many details must be hammered out in negotiations over
and drafting of an UNSER convention (e.g. composition, voting proce-
dures). The above is meant only to be a rough outline of the most important
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powers and controls UNSER would have over space development. Note
that UNSER has no power to propose development projects of its own.
Regulation is kept to a minimum, and development is left in the hands of
private industry and individual governments.
To summarize, UNSER wards off much litigation and potentially dan-gerous competition by imposing a system of prioritized registration. This is
necessary, m any property regime based on the right of the first comer, to
ward off sabotage. Space must be developed, but not at the expense of civil
relations. It will also eliminate private space races. In a space race, two
companies vie for the same site. One company inevitably must arrive sec-
ond and return empty-handed, with nothing to show for its massive resource
expenditures. The UNSER approval process would prevent such waste.
The UNSER approval process screens for environmental violations,
reduces waste and lawsuits, and provides necessary control to protect long-
term growth.
Since project plans, once submitted, are public documents, information
about sites and projects spreads. This is an economically significant point.
A major element of transaction costs is imperfect information. Specifically,
when it's difficult for parties who want to purchase sites to unearth infor-
mation about the sites, or even who it is that owns the sites, they will not
necessarily be able to purchase the site they would find most valuable.When knowledge about the properties for sale in a real estate market is less
than perfect, the costs of property transfer rise and real estate tends to end
up in less efficient hands. UNSER acts as a sort of clearing-house. It cen-
tralizes information about sites and owners. This would lower the cost offinding the right property. And that means we get closer to an efficient al-
location of resources.
And by requiring launch processes to be described in publicized proj-
ect plans, developing nations will be better able to design and build space-
ships of their own.
B. The Banking Problem
What if SpaceCorp, calculating that the value of owning Earth's moon
outweighs the cost of setting up a bogus project, decides to mine the entire
moon for dust. In doing so, SpaceCorp hopes to "bank" the moon and reap
great rewards in the real estate market down the road.
Such banking must be prevented. It is a tremendously wasteful activity
that creates little or no wealth. It even discourages development by others:SpaceCorp, a monopoly owner of moon resources, could charge monopoly
rents on those who would purchase moon sites to develop, and would there-
fore decrease production to monopoly levels.'05 SpaceCorp should not be
rewarded for such a project with ownership of the moon. The moon is of
10- PHILIP AREEDA AND Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 17-18 (5" ed., 1997).
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potentially great value to humanity. We already have enough dust. A legal
regime that rewards such activity is guilty of instigating massively ineffi-
cient behavior.
The problem illuminated by this example can be restated more gener-
ally: Aside from applying for UNSER approval, what must one do to
achieve ownership? The problem of asset banking is a difficult one, and I
cannot offer a definitive answer. I will review four possible ways to com-
bat banking, and recommend one.
C. The Four Systems
1. Acreage tax.
Under this system, UNSER would levy a tax based on the geographical
scope of the proposed project. The LOS deep seabed mining provisions use
a similar tactic. As a result of the tax, companies would find it less finan-
cially attractive to occupy huge tracts of land. If a company was not utiliz-
ing the land productively, the tax would represent a huge onus. The dust-
miner from the previous example would pay a tremendous tax for owner-
ship of the entire moon. The longer the dust-miner had to wait before sell-
ing the real estate, the more expensive ownership would prove to be.
Another advantage to an acreage tax, aside from quashing banking, is
that it would help fund the infrastructure necessary to support large-scale
space exploitation. For instance, an international space police force and an
environmental code enforcement team will be necessary, at the very mini-
mum. Furthermore, it would be a tax directly proportional to use, so those
benefiting the most from the infrastructure would be the ones paying the
most for it.
The disadvantage to such a system is that it raises the price of devel-
opment. For projects with comfortable expected profit margins, the acreage
tax will not be prohibitive. There will inevitably be a number of projects,
however, that would have been borderline-profitable (and positive-
externality-producing), but instead will be pushed into the red by the acre-
age tax. The danger is that an acreage tax might end up being a prohibitive
burden on so many projects that the tax will do more harm (i.e. wealth not
harvested from space) than good (i.e. preventing banking).
There is reason to think that the tax would, in fact, have such an effect.
As mentioned, the LOS levies an acreage tax on deep seabed mining.0 6 As
a result of the exorbitance of that tax, alongside the many other expenses
the LOS tacks onto all developments, industry leaders have doubted that
any deep seabed mining could be carried out profitably under the Conven-
tion." 7 Moreover, the political motives that led to the excessive costs of
1'6LOS, supra note 58.
107 See, e.g., Harry, supra note 59.
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mining under the Convention -- the developing nations' fear that the miner-
als extracted from the deep seabed would compete with the minerals they
mined on land and relied on for wealth -- would likely play a role in the
space context. Regardless of whether minerals and energy might be col-
lected more efficiently with less environmental destruction in space, the
Group of 77 nations might try to push the acreage tax to a level beyond that
which is necessary to prevent banking, in order to crush any competition
space industries present.
All in all, an acreage tax is a formally-simple solution with several at-
tractive features. But because it is set by a governmental body and not the
market, the tax cannot respond to rapid economic shifts, and could as a re-
sult endanger the success of space development.
2. Productive use analysis.
We might foreclose space territory banking schemes by adding one to
the list of conditions required for UNSER approval: "2) UNSER will grant
approval only upon ... e) confirming that the plan is financially justified."
This clause goes to the heart of the banking problem. No longer would a
company be able to waste resources in pursuit of unproductive ownership.
Productivity would be a prerequisite for ownership.
This solution is extremely problematic. First, there are definitional is-
sues. When is a project productive? Is simple profitability the correct
measure? How can we calculate and factor in positive externalities? Is a $1
expected profit enough to justify ownership? It also becomes tough to de-
fine the scope of the project. What if SpaceCorp wanted to mine the entire
moon for diamonds? If there was a single, lkm2 diamond vein but Space-
Corp insisted that the whole moon was part of the project, what arguments
might be made to limit the claim?
Even worse, the bureaucratic costs of this added step would be mind-
boggling. Each project plan would require an in-depth financial review.
Technical experts would be needed to give their opinions about the plan's
feasibility and industry experts would be needed to speculate on the plan's
profitability. Each project proposal would open up a firm to a full audit.
Aside from the costs inherent in conducting this sort of review, there are the
costs of delay. An analysis of this nature might take months, during which
time financing might be lost, the firm might go bankrupt, and the time value
of money takes its toll. And should a project be rejected, the process must
begin all over again.
Worse still, a productive use analysis essentially takes the decision to
develop out of the hands of private industry. There will surely be dis-
agreements as to profitability between private CFOs and UNSER analysts.
Do we want to take the decision to develop out of the hands of the develop-
ers? Should UNSER analysts have the power to veto a project on financial
grounds, when the company itself is willing to take on the risk of space de-
velopment, perhaps as a result of greater technical expertise or an under-
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standing of its market not apparent to UNSER? Litigation would prolifer-
ate.
3. Post hoc productive use analysis
The problems, just discussed, with analyzing profitability ex ante can
be sidestepped by postponing productivity analysis. Perhaps UNSER
should permit the utilization of space without initial regard to productivity,
but only grant ownership rights to the site if, eventually, the project shows
an actual profit. This would put control of the project back into the hands
of the risk-taking developers.
This solution, however, has its own problems. There is simply too
much riding on showing a profit. If a project shows a profit, the developer
would receive an additional windfall: ownership. If a project turns out to be
a money-loser, whether $1 billion or $1, then the developer -- already reel-
ing from the unsuccessful project -- would take another hit: no ownership
rights. This post hoc productivity analysis magnifies the risk and generates
investment-hostile uncertainty. What's more, post hoc analysis would en-
courage corruption. If a company needs another $1 million of profit to se-
cure ownership rights worth $1 billion, it would feel overwhelming pressure
to cook its books or to manufacture fraudulent contracts.
4. Auction
An auction of ownership rights, held by UNSER, would be a much
better solution. Under such a regime, anyone, at any time, could request an
auction of any unowned site. Ownership rights to the site would go to the
highest bidder.
Even after acquiring ownership via auction, the owner should not be
permitted use of its site until UNSER approvals have been obtained.
The auction system has significant advantages. An auction would, by
its very nature, put territory into the hands of the firm that values it most.
Also, by creating a single market, transaction costs, in the form of informa-
tion costs, are reduced. Without a centralized auction, a property might be
sold at the fringes of the market where only a few buyers ever learn of the
sale. A diffuse market with imperfect information means that the party who
values a property the most will not always be able to take part in the bar-
gaining. Thus it would be wise to require all sales -- even resale of pre-
owned space property -- to be conducted at UNSER auctions. By creating a
clearing-house through which all properties are advertised and sold, alloca-
tive efficiency would be heightened.
An auction system would also solve the banking problem. In order for
the dust-miner to gain ownership of the entire moon, he would have to out-
bid everyone else (even groups of investors and international consortia)
who had any interest in any of the moon. Even if the dust-miner succeeded
in purchasing the moon, he would never be able to turn a profit. If half the
moon was worth $1 billion to A, and the other half worth $1 billion to B,
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then A and B would have together driven the auction price up to a mini-
mum of $2 billion. Thus the dust-miner would have had to pay more than
$2 billion for ownership rights that he could only sell for $2 billion. The
auction eliminates the incentive to bank property.
Obviously, under an auction regime there is no need for UNSER's pri-
oritization scheme. There is no need to police against a sabotage-infested
land rush. Once a site is purchased, ownership rights (including the right to
exclude) vest in the owner. The law automatically prioritizes the claim of
the purchaser/owner over all others.
Auctions, and space exploration in general, might be facilitated by be-
stowing rights on prospectors. We might make a rule: if a prospector sub-
mits information about a site to UNSER, the prospector shall get a
percentage of the purchaser's earnings from that site. Such information
would be made available to the public prior to auction. Of course, the rule
will have to specify the requisite type of information and degree of detail.
Bob Zubrin suggests that any private company using remote sensing to ex-
plore a portion of a celestial body with gamma ray spectrometer chemical
analysis and photography to a resolution of lm2 per pixel deserves a royalty
of 10 percent of all resultant profits.0 8 Higher percentages might be war-
ranted by more detailed analysis. Prospector percentenaries should not af-
fect the auction, since each bidder will be affected equally, and all will
adjust their willingness-to-pay downward in proportion to the amount of
profits that go to the prospector.
It is clear that the prospector's "take" must be calculated based on
eventual profits, not on the initial auction price. Although the initial auc-
tion price is easier to collect and is more certain, it also creates a significant
danger of corruption. If the prospector takes a percentage off the auction
price, it is in the prospector's best interest to inflate the price, even by mis-
representing the results of his exploration. By restricting the prospector to a
percentage of actual earnings, the incentive to fraudulently inflate the auc-
tion price by falsifying data is eliminated.
Building prospector rights into the property law creates an additional
benefit: specialization. By rewarding space prospecting, the auction-based
legal system makes it possible for companies to specialize in space explo-
ration. A mining company could thus concentrate on mining techniques
without concerning itself with remote sensing technology. Ordinarily, this
could be accomplished through private bargaining: a company interested in
learning about a site could contract with a private prospecting company.
Within a public auction regime, however, if prospecting were left to the pri-
vate market, CorpA could pay the prospector to deal exclusively with
CorpA and not disclose information to competing bidders. As a result of
08Bob Zubrin, Opening Space Exploration to Private Enterprise, AD AsmA, Jul./Aug.
1994, at 27.
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the non-disclosure contract, CorpB and CorpC would either be forced to
hire prospectors of their own (a huge waste of resources), or would be
locked out of the auction for lack of information. In order to ensure that the
auction runs competitively -- with maximally efficient results and minimum
costs -- relevant information must be disseminated. But if prospectors are
enjoined by law to disclose their research publicly, they are in no position
to bargain for a fee for their services. If the law requires prospectors to "tell
all," the law must also compensate them for their services. A percentenary,
if set to a level that approximates a fair bargain between the prospector and
the recipient of the information, should suffice. Zubrin suggests yet another
benefit. At this time, exploration and prospecting are within current tech-
nological capabilities. Extensive space mining is not, however; therefore
there is little incentive for the private sector to invest in space exploration.
If prospectors were given rights at an auction, however, space exploration
would have market value now. There might well be speculators willing to
invest $100 million to assay an asteroid on the gamble that its percentenary
would mature, when space mining becomes feasible and practical, to $10
billion or more.'0 9 Already, companies are planning to launch prospecting
missions. SpaceDev, stating that they're "going to use common-sense
business tactics to explore deep space," plans to launch a robotic Near Earth
Asteroid Prospector ("NEAP") in the foreseeable future." 0 The NEAP will
embark on a search for valuable asteroids, the information about which
SpaceDev will then sell for "a profit.""' By reserving future financial
rights for space prospectors, the legal regime would magnify the current
value of prospecting, thereby stimulating private funding of space explora-
tion.
In a fundamental way, an auction regime embodies a different path
from those we have so far examined. It rejects the right of grab and the first
come, first served policy altogether. The auction occupies the middle
ground between laissezfaire privatization of space development and a be-
lief that space is the equal birthright of all humanity.
Under every other system of ownership so far suggested, a concern has
always been that developers seem to be acquiring exclusive rights to some-
thing -- outer space -- that should be owned by all. Throughout this essay I
have attempted to respond to these issues, pointing out that development by
the few is actually in the best interests of the many, and that ownership
rights are an important way to incentivize development in the right way. 12
Nevertheless, distributional justice concerns may still loom. Distribu-
tional justice has not been the guiding principle of this property law, nor, I
109id.
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believe, should it be. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen have argued that if
wealth redistribution is a §oal, it should be accomplished by means of taxa-
tion, not property rights."
Even accepting this analysis, there may still be politically-driven dis-
tributional justice concerns. The dilemma we are faced with, if we do de-
sire to redistribute the wealth of space, is that no international body has the
power to tax the spacefaring nations' space profits. The auction and acre-
age tax regimes create a centralized pool of money that could then be redis-
tributed.
Thus we discover another reason to prefer the auction system. It re-
quires developers to compensate "all humanity" by paying for their sites.
By treating auction proceeds as a common fund, UNSER would be able to
redistribute funds in any way that the international community determines
to be fair and just. In this way, such a regime would help relieve both effi-
ciency and distributional concerns. Everyone is happy: spacefaring nations
get ownership, and developing nations get a share of the pie.
D. Problem: What if the hypothetical company SpaceCorp, instead of
mining the moon for dust, discovers that the moon is filled with valuable
minerals and authors a proposal to mine the entire moon?
Assuming the project is very profitable, neither the acreage tax, nor the
productive use analysis, nor the auction would prevent SpaceCorp from
owning the entire moon.
But should we fear such lunar domination? This author thinks we
should not. If SpaceCorp is so adept at space mining that it is capable of
profitably mining the entire moon in compliance with the environmental
safeguards, time limits, and other conditions of gaining UNSER approval,
more power to them. Whatever the source, the people of Earth will benefit
from the influx of resources, the expanded job market, and all the other sec-
ondary benefits I've been discussing throughout.
In general, we should not worry about SpaceCorp, or a few companies,
or a nation dominating any part of space. As soon as CorpB finds a more
profitable way to use part of SpaceCorp's land, CorpB will purchase that
part. If SpaceCorp can earn $1 billion/acre on the moon, and CorpB's new
lunar project would earn it $2 billion/acre, then SpaceCorp and CorpB
would have every reason to bargain to a purchase agreement.
E. Sovereignty
The issues addressed in this paper raise many further important ques-
tions that are beyond the scope of the current project. One of these is sov-
ereignty, about which I will say only a few words.
1 3Cooter and Ulen, supra note 81, at 104-06.
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Sovereignty over land has been said to include two powers: the power
of a state to apply its rule of law, and the power to exclude all other states
from exercising their authority." 4 Development in space must not occur in
a lawless environment. Some government must be sovereign over each
owned parcel of space real estate, so that rule of law is applied. Without it,
space would most likely be rife with crime against property and person.
On what basis should the law of space assign sovereign power? Per-
haps the developer's nationality should be determinative; after all, the de-
veloper's home state already has jurisdiction over the spaceships and its
crew. 15 In the case of multi-national corporations, their national affilia-
tions would be stipulated by the articles of incorporation.
Sovereignty can create problems for property transfers. For example,
years from now Israeli corporations might create a large space colony. To
support the function of this colony, Israel builds an infrastructure: roads,
hospitals, police, water districts, etc. What will happen when the Israeli
owner of a site near the colony's center wishes to sell? Will the sale be re-
stricted to Israeli buyers? Economic theory tells us that the person who
most values a site must be able to purchase it, regardless of their nationality,
or the system will lose efficiency. But if a site at the center of the Israeli
colony would come under, e.g., Nigerian sovereignty as a result of its sale,
the Israeli colony's infrastructure would be imperiled, and the Nigerian en-
clave might be cut off without services.
We have faced this same problem on Earth since time immemorial.
States have traditionally responded in one of two ways: (1) by restricting
land ownership to nationals, or (2) by allowing non-nationals to purchase
but retaining sovereignty. However, both policies would injure developing
nations. If developing nations could not gain sovereignty over space terri-
tory by purchasing it, then they would be much less able to overcome the
developed nations' head start in space. I will only note that this dilemma
exists and must eventually be resolved.
When policy-makers eventually attempt to solve the problem of sover-
eignty, it is imperative that they acknowledge an inevitability: space colo-
nies will eventually desire self-government. The yoke of distant
government has, throughout history, been thrown off. As space colonies
grow, they will ultimately demand self-rule and independence. Modem ne-
gotiators would do well to recognize this as they begin to formulate a law of
sovereignty.
VII. ACCOMPLISHING CHANGE
The Outer Space Treaty, as noted, would need substantial revision and
amendment to accommodate the suggestions made in this paper.
114 JOHN KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 52 (1973).
1 5Outer Space Treaty, art. VIII.
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How can the changes suggested herein be effected? It's not within the
scope of this essay to deliver a complete analysis of international political
and negotiational strategies. U.N. politicking is a topic all its own. How-
ever, I will make two suggestions that might help bring about the reforma-
tion of space property law.
A. Submit the GSO to appropriation
The GSO is part of what we might call "space itself," i.e., not part of a
celestial body. This essay has not suggested a right of ownership over
space itself, for several reasons, the most basic and fatal of which is that
there would be no way to define static boundaries. However, the GSO is in
many ways more like celestial bodies than space itself. Like celestial bod-
ies and unlike space itself, the GSO has great value, but is in limited supply.
Like celestial bodies but unlike space itself, the GSO has easily-delineable
borders. Like celestial bodies but unlike space itself, the GSO is very sen-
sitive to environmental decay. 1 6 Plus, unlike most areas of space itself,
which I believe should remain non-appropriable and developed and regu-
lated only by an international body with the goal of permitting safe and un-
fettered transportation, development of the GSO will benefit from
appropriation and ownership.
There is, of course, a threshold issue: is the GSO a part of space? The
term "outer space" is undefined in international law. The initial doctrinal
problem, then, is deciding whether the GSO is a part of terrestrial airspace
or outer space. United States policy espouses a "functional" definition of
outer space: wherever a preordained set of outer space activities takes place
is "outer space."" 7 Orbiting satellites would be counted as an outer space
activity. The "spatial" theory, a popular alternative to the functional defini-
tion, prefers to draw a line above which everything is considered to be outer
space.' 8 The standard boundary line is approximately 96 to 110 kilometers
above the Earth's surface, which is the lowest altitude at which a satellite
can currently maintain orbit." 9 Both theories, then, would consider the
GSO to be part of outer space. Aside from the persuasive merits of these
competing arguments, it can of course be stipulated, by treaty, that the GSO
is a part of space.
To make ownership of the GSO an effective political tool, ownership
must be granted on a basis different from those heretofore outlined. Instead
116Unlike the vast reaches of undifferentiated space, the GSO and celestial bodies can
accumulate debris very easily, have the potential to attract large numbers of competing EM-
producing entities into a very limited area, and, most importantly, are exhaustible resources.
"
7Kosmo, supra note 32, at 1061-62, citing CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 524 (1982) and Jakhu, The Legal Status of the Geo-
stationary Orbit, ANNALs OF AIR & SPACE L. 333,337-41 (1982).
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of granting ownership to those who would use the GSO or to those who
would purchase it at auction, we would grant ownership on a theory of ter-
restrial property rights extended upward, from a negotiated floor (beginning
above airspace) up to a negotiated ceiling (perhaps 130,000 Iam). Assigning
ownership by tracing one's borders to the sky has roots deep in Roman law.
Thus each nation sitting below the GSO would own a piece to either sell or
lease out for colossal profits.
This inducement would be extremely politically advantageous to a
property-rights reform movement. Many of the nations that currently sup-
port the Moon Treaty and oppose private ownership would be the benefici-
aries if the GSO were divvied up. In fact, there is already evidence that
such a policy would be a welcome change. In 1976, Brazil, Colombia,
Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire -- every equatorial
nation but two -- issued the Bogota Declaration.120 The Bogota Declaration
argued that orbits are caused by Earth's gravitational pull; thus the orbits
above the equator, including the GSO, are natural resources owned by the
nations supplying the gravity, i.e. the equatorial nations.12' Whatever the
merits of this argument,1 2it evinces a clear desire by these nations to have
political and, more importantly, financial control over the portions of the
GSO overlying their territories. There is thus a strong indication that what
basically amounts to the bribing of equatorial nations would not fall on deaf
ears.
Several of the equatorial beneficiary nations represent political power-
houses within the Group of 77 (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia). Thus, the compro-
mise policy of permitting appropriation of the GSO would go a long way
towards easing the developing nations' resistance to the suggested property-
rights reforms.
Would we need to supplement GSO ownership with a compulsory li-
censing system so that equatorial nations would not be able to price-gouge?
Probably not. First, equatorial nations would be in price competition with
each other. Second, much of the GSO lies above international waters, and
so would remain free. Then again, the GSO is not fungible for some uses.
For example, a satellite transmitter for a German communications network
might need to be above Congo. In this case, a natural monopoly would
form, and Congo would be able to charge monopoly rents on the German
transmitter. Monopoly rents eliminate the lower end of the market, and re-
duce the total utility produced. 123 Therefore, in cases of natural monopolies
120Gabon and Somalia did not ratify the declaration. Christol, supra note 117, at 895.
121 Bogota Declaration, December 3, 1976, reprinted in Christol, supra note 117, at 891-
895.
12in fact, this position has been widely rejected. According to accepted science, the
GSO is created by the combined gravitational pulls of the earth, sun, moon, and more distant
bodies. Christol, supra note 117, at 452.
' Areeda and Kaplow, supra note 105, at 17-18.
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we might need a compulsory licensing system with maximum price re-
straints to maximize the total social welfare.
There is another advantage to authorizing ownership of the GSO. The
GSO is fast becoming seriously polluted. The numbers of orbiting objects,
including satellites and debris, along with interference created by EM-
waves, is starting to pose problems for both the ITU and the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization ("ITELSAT") (a private or-
ganization devoted to the regulation and maintenance of a global telecom-
munications satellite system). 24 If equatorial states owned the GSO and
were in the business of renting it out, then these states would have a na-
tional interest in keeping the GSO clean to protect their source of income.
The equatorial states, as well as the states with satellites in the GSO, would
thus have an interest in sanctioning (via litigation or international agree-
ment) states that litter the GSO.
B. Trickle-down economics, trickle-down technology.
The changes to the OST proposed in this essay would encourage and
hasten the conversion of potential wealth-in-space into actual wealth-on-
Earth. As already argued, bringing wealth into a system is an absolute
good, aiding all humanity (however indirectly), including developing na-
tions.
But there is another, more direct way in which low-tech nations can
benefit. As ownership rights boost the incentive to exploit outer space's re-
sources, more developers will jump at the chance. And the more people
jumping at the chance and flying up into space to glean the space-borne
profits, the cheaper and safer it will become to carry out such space proj-
ects. That is, the more profitable it becomes to exploit space, the greater the
impetus will be to develop new technology that permits easier access to
space. And among the prime beneficiaries of more accessible space travel
will be those nations -- the developing, low-tech nations -- who are cur-
rently not space-capable.
This, of course, will work with, and be facilitated by, the openness of
plans under the UNSER system. We should not force the space-capable
nations to share their wealth (as is required by the Moon Treaty, and as de-
veloping nations are pushing for in interpreting the OST), for to do so
would discourage exploitation and space travel, and thus make space proj-
ects less regular, and thus less affordable and safe. Instead, by supporting
the development of new technology in an efficient, free market environ-
ment, we thereby give developing nations the chance to go into space on
their own. In this way we can increase everyone's access to space. And
that's one of the designated goals of the OST itself.
124 van Traa-Engelman, supra note 90, at 112-133.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The notion that our future in space is reserved to the superpowers, or
even to governments, has passed. Private commercial space investment,
unforeseen at the inception of the Outer Space Treaty's dominion, has
grown apace, while governmental investment has shrunk. 25 Commercial
activities in space now generate more revenues than government con-
tracts.1
26
The time has come to reject the old space law whose "pro-state, anti-
private-enterprise hue.. .darkly colors space activities to this day.' 2 7
I believe that some changes, whether the ones outlined in this essay or
others I have not considered, are necessary, if we are to push our species out
to the stars. Thanks to the development of a new generation of "single-
stage-to-orbit" launchers, launch costs may drop by 30 percent in the just
next few years.12 8 Companies are researching opportunities in new uses of
the GSO, in mining, even in tourism: a consortium including Lunacorp and
Carnegie Mellon University hopes to send two camera-equipped rovers to
the moon, not for geological surveying, but to let virtual tourists experience
a lunar drive. 129 The recent discovery of large quantities of water on our
moon might cut the cost of lunar missions in half again: the water, con-
verted into liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, could satisfy fuel needs for
return flights. 30 The moon could even end up as a refueling station for
more distant journeys.
Space law must take into account private needs and build on private
opportunities; to do this, it must embrace the principle of private property.
If humanity hands control of the exploitation of space over to an interna-
tional political body in an effort to use space development as a wealth-
redistribution mechanism, the entire project is likely to fall on its face and
there won't be any wealth to redistribute. Humanity will lose out on
knowledge, adventure, living room, and resources. In contrast, the greatest
good for the greatest number will occur if property rights are expanded and
clarified in the ways suggested throughout this essay.
One small legal step permitting the private ownership of space territory
would be one giant leap for mankind.
125Highlights 1996, supra note 1, at 1.
126F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wisc.), Viewpoint, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 20, 1997, at 90 (citing a study conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick and SpaceVest).
127Nathan C. Goldman, The Maturing Law of Outer Space, TRIAL, Dec. 1995, at 42.
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